Regarding the pipeline, there are at least two paths the legislature could take. One would be to spend much of its effort changing the
economics of the pipeline and the second is to change the economics of the
producer. The legislature has chosen the path that would change the economics
of the producer although it could still do some things that would change the
economics of the pipeline as well.
Changing the economics
of the producer
This path primarily focuses on what the state can give up
in order to get the producers to move forward with the project. The ultimate decision remains with the producers regardless of what the state gives up in the process.
I use the term
project to refer to the pipeline because that is how the producers look at it. I understand that there will be
several smaller decisions/contracts regarding gas treatment plants, pipeline
participation, etc., but the producers will look at each of these in relation
to how they can maximize their individual profits on the whole. Each negotiation will result
in winners and losers. The negotiations will not be about all of the parties
participating in a bigger pie even though the pie will certainly be bigger. The
negotiations, at each stage, will be about reducing risk and costs and maximizing
value to each producer from their individual perspective.
The path the legislature has chosen will course through many
decisions. The bill before the legislature is not the first decision, and it is
not the last the legislature will have to make. The decisions made in the
current legislation will refine the path. Luckily, so far the legislation does
not contain any major long term commitments, it merely sets direction. What the legislature doesn’t understand is that unless it works to change the economics of the pipeline, it has done little to move the project forward. Any commitment regarding oil, for example, does little to change the economics of the pipeline.
Things that will change the economics of the pipeline are
reducing the costs of infrastructure to the pipeline, maintaining
infrastructure during the construction of the pipeline, understanding
debt/equity ratios, making sure that the interest earned on equity and the
interest on debt are as low as possible, making sure that Alaskans only pay for
distance based tariffs for their gas (make sure you understand what the
producers mean when they agree to distance based tariffs. It may be different
that what you think), making sure that the tax on gas is fair to the state and
to the producers, understanding where risk shifts to the state so that the
decisions you make regarding that risk will be intentional, no surprises,
making decisions to support a particular issue regarding the pipeline because you
understand the consequences and agree they are acceptable, not because they are
politically correct in an election year.
The most important thing to remember is that this path
requires the legislature to depend on the producers to move the project forward. If the
producers feel, at any stage along the way, that the economics are not
sufficient to move the project forward, they will return to the state, not with
hat in hand asking for more, but with a club demanding more; and the state will
be at a disadvantage of not knowing if the producers really need whatever they
are demanding to move the pipeline forward or if they are merely taking
advantage of the situation. The state will be in a position of acquiescing to
the producers demands or reaping the wrath of their constituents for killing
the pipeline. The producers will certainly have their contractors and
supporters writing letters and testifying to the need for whatever the
producers request. I am not accusing the producers of being bad. I just
understand what they will do when given the leverage to extract additional
concessions along the way. It will become clear that what you
thought was the deal today will not be the deal two years from now or even months from now when another
decision-making milestone is reached. You have released control of
decision-making to the producers and you will reap the outcome.
Economics of the
pipeline
The legislature can have a substantial impact on the
economics of the pipeline, but it is a more difficult path than the one chosen.
It requires more research and understanding. It requires a different kind of risk-taking. The difference between changing the economics of the pipeline and changing the
economics of the producers is partially the difference between taking the risk with
current dollars (changing the economics of the pipeline) which the legislature
could be held accountable for on the failure leg, and taking the risk with future dollars (changing the
economics of the producers) which the legislature will probably not be held accountable
for if history is a indicator of reality.
There are many ways to impact the economics of the pipeline.
I would recommend the legislature understand these as best they can before they
proceed forward with agreeing to anything with the producers.
Paying for the cost of infrastructure and not placing that
burden on the pipeline will have an incremental impact on tariff. The
legislature needs to understand how much before they agree to those costs. Some have said that the producers have not asked the state to pay for the costs of infrastructure. My answer is wait. It's in the legislation and it will be in the proposal when the administration returns to the legislature in the next phase. Interestingly, the administration should have been focused on improving infrastructure for the last several years in anticipation of moving the pipeline forward and the state should continue to do so in the future. I am not against the state paying for infrastructure, or at least a portion of infrastructure. I just want to make sure the state understands the value of that payment and captures the accompanying value for the state.
The legislature needs to understand the impact of equity and
debt on the pipeline. The debt/equity ratio will have a substantial impact on
the tariff. The pipeline owners (especially TransCanada since that is where
they will capture their value) will want to argue for a high proportion and large
return on equity. The producers will join TransCanada in asking for a large
return on equity. This is a way for them to balance their risk. They will also argue
that, if the State participates as an owner, it will join the other owners in reaping the benefit of
that return on equity. This is a two-edged sword and it cuts both ways. I
believe that a lower return on equity and a lower proportion of equity serves
the state in the long run, and it certainly serves explorers and those not
fortunate enough to own a piece of the pipeline.
Regarding debt/equity ratio, the state should argue for the
smallest equity and the largest debt that financing will allow while not
significantly impacting the cost of debt. The interest on equity and the
interest on debt are substantially different and the legislature should
understand those before it agrees to anything in this area. Interest on equity
is often more than twice as much as interest on debt; so every dollar of equity
allowed impacts the cost of the tariff substantially more than a dollar of
debt.
One of the ways to impact the tariff has to do with the
timing of paying back the equity. If payment on the equity was delayed until
most or all of the debt was paid back, the tariff would substantially benefit, and it
would also reduce the cost of the debt which would have an additional impact on
the tariff. Of course, the only party that would agree to such a deal would be
the state. But the state may want to consider such a decision since this decision would
have a substantial impact on the tariff and a corresponding impact on the
economics of the pipeline.
The financing of the pipeline and the various elements of
the project needs to be understood thoroughly. Many of the options that would
impact financing have not even been considered. The producers will suggest
that this will be dealt with in the contract negotiations, but some of the
possible alternatives will be taken off the table if the state does not
evaluate its options now. State ownership, how much of the pipeline the state
should own, and how it should manage its ownership are decisions to be made
sooner rather than later. There are many more issues that should be addressed, but the above issues are some of the most important.
Some would ask why they should consider anything I write,
especially since I have been out of the state for several years. A good
question. The answer is that I worked in the oil and gas industry for over 20
years and participated in several failed attempts to move a pipeline project
forward. I also represented the state in pipeline contract negotiations with
the producers during the Murkowski administration. I watched the producers
negotiate with the state and with each other. I observed their areas of
agreement and their differences. There were two points that became clear
through the negotiations: 1) each producer attempted to reduce individual risk
and maximize individual value. Interestingly what each producer valued was
different and led to more conflict between the producers than conflict with the state,
and 2) the producers were in alignment in attempting to shift as much of the
risk and cost as possible to the state and obtain as much value through reduced
taxes and other fees as they could.
The state has many decisions to make regarding the pipeline.
My hope is that you don’t make any commitments without fully understanding the value and
impact of those commitments and that you make commitments for the shortest
timeframe possible so that bad decisions don’t linger for that many years. My hope is that there will
be many more good decisions than bad.
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