The Specious Argument

I recently finished watching the March 10, 2011 Governor’s Press Availability on Gavel to Gavel where the governor discussed his tax change legislation. He discussed the three areas of focus for the bill, 1) new units (tax reductions for areas not in production now), 2) infield drilling tax credits, and 3) progressivity changes. And he explained that his administration is “focused on creating more production here, more investment here, more jobs here.”

This is all well and good and I commend him for his energy and effort, but I question his response to those who have expressed concerns that his legislation could cost the state billions of dollars. In response to those stated concerns about the cost of the legislation he stated “Let’s talk about that specious argument before we go any further.” His comment was out of character for the governor and without a rational basis for the position taken. In the past the governor has not used such a pejorative comment in referring to those who oppose him. Normally he would merely have responded with his position, supported by facts and analysis without putting the opposition down. So why did he use such a strategy this time?

There are several possible reasons why he attacked the opposition with name calling instead of analysis.

Perhaps because he didn’t remember that it was his own staff who wrote the fiscal note that stated the financial impact of the change to the tax would be in the billions. Perhaps he was not around to listen to his Department of Revenue Commissioner and revenue staff explain that the impact would be in the billions. Perhaps he did not read his consultant’s report and did not listen to his consultant testify that the long term cost of the change could be approximately $20 billion.

Or perhaps he is just uncertain about the position he has taken and doesn’t know how to logically defend it; so he reverted to name calling and putting down the opposition.

Or perhaps he doesn’t understand cost/benefit analysis. In its most basic form cost/benefit analysis is first understanding the short and long term cost of the change as well as you can. Once you fully understand the costs of the change, you must determine what the proposed benefits will be and the chance of those benefits occurring. Then you calculate the difference. The result may be that there will be more jobs for Alaskans or the life of the pipeline will be extended, or the possibility that the state may never recoup the difference in tax it gave up in the legislation. Even with the potential negative impact of not recouping the cost of the change in tax, the state may determine the change is still a reasonable course of action. The state may determine it wants short and long-term jobs and an extended life of the pipeline more than it wants to fill its savings account. This would be an acceptable analysis.

But what is not acceptable is not counting the costs and arguing that those costs are not real, that they are “fantasy,” that concerns regarding the costs are “specious.” The costs are real. They can be determined within in a reasonable range, and they range in the billions of dollars. What is not real, what cannot be determined, and what can only be hoped for are the benefits from such a tax change. Those benefits may occur, but they cannot be calculated because a third party must make an independent decision sometime in the future based on present actions by the legislature. Maybe it will be worth it, but the state should count the cost and understand the risk before making such an important decision.

What the governor should have done is provide the analysis necessary to support his position, provide the analysis necessary for the Alaska public to support his legislation, provide the analysis necessary for the legislature to pass his proposed legislation.

What the governor should have done is provide the legislature with an analysis of possible decline curves.

The governor’s consultant used a 6% decline curve to define what might happen if the legislation was not passed; yet the governor’s Revenue Commissioner presented an estimation of future revenue based on a 3.2% decline curve under the current tax. What does the governor believe to be true? What are the ranges of possible decline and what are the bases for those assumptions?

What the governor should have done is explain to the legislature where the governor believes the new reserves are to be found.

A thorough understanding of reserves potential is essential for the legislature to understand so they can determine if there are sufficient potential reserves to compensate the state for the lost revenue from the change in the tax.

What follows are projections from the United States Geological Survey and the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas of resource potential of exploration areas of the north slope.

NPRA: consists generally of lands west of the Colville River and north of the Brooks Range.

The National Petrolem Reserve-Alaska is not a good source for future oil revenue. The USGS has recently substantially reduced the reserves of technically recoverable conventional accumulations of oil it believes are located in NPRA to less than a billion barrels of oil, about 10 percent of what it previously projected to be in NPRA (See 2010 Updated Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska (NPRA) ).

Beaufort Sea: consists of all offshore state lands between Pt. Barrow and the U.S-Canadian border.

The Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas has projected: “The petroleum potential in the area is considered moderate to high.” (See the January 2011 Five-year Program of Proposed Oil and Gas Leasing Program Report at page 22).

But concerns about oil spills in the offshore environment, concerns about the oil industry’s ability to clean up oil in broken ice, concerns about bowhead whales, polar bear habitat and two species of endangered seals may make it difficult to explore for or produce oil from offshore in the near-term.

North Slope Areawide Oil and Gas Lease Sale: the area consists of all state-owned lands between the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPRA) and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), and from the Beaufort Sea to the north and the Umiat Meridian Baseline to the south (an east/west line drawn just north of Umiat, Alaska).

The Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas has projected: “Petroleum Potential in this area is considered low to moderate with the potential generally increasing from south to north.” (See the January 2011 Five-year Program of Proposed Oil and Gas Leasing Program Report at page 27).

North Slope Foothills: the area consists of all state-owned lands between the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPRA) and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) south of the Umiat Meridian Baseline and north of the Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve.

The North Slope foothills are not a good source future oil potential. The Department of Natural Resourses, Division of Oil and Gas has stated “Petroleum potential in the area is considered relatively high for gas, and relatively low for oil." (See the January 2011 Five-year Program of Proposed Oil and Gas Leasing Program Report at page 30).”

Even though the governor believes that these areas “have not been touched for thousands of years,” they have actually been evaluated and tested geologically. That is why the Division of Oil and Gas can project the potential for oil in this area as relatively low. The legislature should request a map of the north slope depicting all the wells that have been drilled. Then the legislature should ask one of the geologists at the Division of Oil and Gas to explain why they believe the oil potential in this area is low.

Federal OCS: the offshore area in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas seaward of the state offshore.

Even though the governor referred to Shell’s exploration activities in the Chukchi Sea during his press availability, the governor’s tax legislation does not affect Shell’s offshore projects from an economic standpoint because the tax credits do not apply to the federal offshore and the state has no power to tax the federal offshore.

What the governor should have done is explain to the legislature when the new reserves are projected to be produced.

The state land with the greatest oil potential (high potential) is the state offshore, the most difficult area to permit and develop a field. Bringing production on from the state offshore will take at least 10 years and probably closer to 15 years if it can be done. In fact even permitting and developing a new onshore field (low to moderate potential) will take at least 10 years. Therefore we should not expect or depend on any revenue from new exploration in the short-term and little in the long-term.

What the governor should have done is explain the projected revenue and the timing of that revenue from the reserves he proposes will be found.

Even though we don’t expect much from new exploration, the credits have not cost the state much. But maybe someday, many years from now, any new production to be found will be a net positive from a revenue standpoint (after deducting the cost of the credits). In addition, what can be determined with reasonable certainty is that revenue from new exploration will not begin to balance the cost from the tax change for at least 10 years.

What the governor should have done is explain to the legislature the criteria the governor is using to determine if or when the tax change has failed.

In his Press Availability the governor suggested that the legislature would not sit idly by if the proposed tax change was not having the desired effect. What the governor needs to share with the legislature are his expectations for a successful outcome. What would he consider a success? What would the governor consider a failure? How long is the governor willing to wait to see positive impacts from the tax change?

Finally the governor in a final posture challenged the press to ask the “nay sayers” that say the governor’s proposal is going to cost so much what their plan would be. Well I’m not necessarily a nay sayer, and I am certainly not a legislator,  but I do believe the governor and the legislature should count the cost before they make such broad sweeping changes to the oil tax. And as far as proposing a plan, I have written close to 40 articles in this blog proposing what the governor and legislature should do, but if the governor doesn’t understand what I am suggesting he is free to give me a call and I will be glad to help him out.

Additional Note

The governor made one comment regarding the large diameter pipeline that is worth clarifying. In referring to the position of the pipeline companies he stated that “Before we commit to buying pipe, we need fiscal certainty.” That would suggest he believes that TransCanada and Exxon or Denali pipeline company needs fiscal certainty before they can commit to buy pipe. Actually the pipeline company does not need fiscal certainty; the shippers need fiscal certainty and they need it before they are willing to commit their gas to the open season. Fiscal certainty has nothing to do with the pipeline companies buying pipe. Fiscal certainty is being requested by the shippers before they are willing to commit their gas at the open season. That is one of the reasons why the open season process has stalled.  I am surprised at this basic misunderstanding of who needs fiscal certainty, when it is needed and the risks associated with moving a pipeline project forward.